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Abstract
With its commitment to double the share of renewable fuels in electricity generation to 
at least 30% by 2020, the German government has embarked on a potentially costly 
policy course whose public support remains an open empirical question. Building 
on household survey data, in this paper we trace peoples‘ willingness-to-pay (WTP) 
for various fuel mixes in electricity generation, and capture preference heterogeneity 
among respondents using random parameter techniques. Based on our estimates, we 
trace out the locus that links the premia charged for speciﬁ  c electricity mixes with the 
fraction of people supporting the policy. Albeit people‘s WTP for a certain fuel mix in 
electricity generation is positively correlated to the renewable fuel share, our results 
imply that the current surcharge eﬀ  ectively exhausts the ﬁ  nancial scope for subsidizing 
renewable fuels.
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Increasing the share of renewable fuels in the energy mix is a prominent topic
in today’s debate on how to mitigate climate change and how to reduce import
dependency on fossil fuels. Germany aims at increasing the share of renewable
fuels in electricity generation to 30% in 2020, and provides a feed-in tariﬀ in
order to encourage the production of green electricity. This subsidy is paid by the
electricity consumer by means of a levy on top of its electricity price. According
to the German Government, a levy of 1.1 euro-cent per kilowatt-hour (ct/kWh)
was raised in 2008, while the levy more than doubled since 2004 (BMU 2007,
2008).
Numerous empirical studies have examined the extent to which people are
willing to pay price premia for green electricity, and have found a substantial
market potential.1 However, these studies typically consider a situation in which
consumers act as sovereigns and people are free to decide whether to consume
green electricity. By contrast, the German feed-in tariﬀ commits all consumers
to pay for a certain economy-wide electricity mix, in which the share of renewable
fuels continually increases.
While this political decision triggers the market outcome in terms of a speciﬁc
electricity mix associated with a speciﬁc levy, people must not necessarily approve
this policy. The question arises to what extent the population consents on this
ﬁnancial obligation. Against this backdrop, this paper aims at assessing the
maximal levy that can be charged for a speciﬁc electricity mix in Germany, such
that a majority of people eligible to vote would approve the political commitment.
We analyze in the retrospective for 2008 whether the policy maker have acted on
behalf of their voters; we further consider two future green electricity scenarios
– which are both in line with the national target of 30% green electricity – and
1See amongst others, Fouquet (1998), Eikeland (1998), Goett et al. (2000), Batley et al. (2001),
Roe et al. (2001), Zarnikau (2003), Menges et al. (2005), Bollino (2009), Scarpa and Willis
(2010). Menegaki (2008) provides a comprehensive review of the recent literature.
4provide insights into the voter’s preferences for reasons of political guidance.
Building on data from a large-scale survey among several thousand house-
holds in Germany, we trace peoples’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for speciﬁc mixes
of fossil, renewable, and nuclear fuels in electricity generation. Using random
parameter econometric techniques within a hedonic regression framework, we es-
timate household-speciﬁc WTP as a function of the electricity mix, and thereby
capture various degrees of heterogeneity between the households. Using these
results, we proceed with calculating people’s WTP within the respectively con-
sidered situation, and juxtapose the WTP ﬁgures with rising scales of the levy.
By these means we elicit what cost might be imposed on the population for a
speciﬁc electricity mix such that a majority of people eligible to vote would still
endorse that policy. Our results stress an actual dilemma for the energy policy:
despite the fact that most people obviously dislike nuclear fuels in electricity gen-
eration, their willingness-to-pay for assisting renewable fuels is also limited. Thus,
ﬁnding the right balance between the charged levy and a sustainable electricity
mix might become a challenging task.
The remainder of the paper reads as follows. The following Section 2 describes
the design of our survey, the survey instrument and the sample. Descriptives
of respondents’ WTP as well as regression results follow in Section 3. These
results serve for investigating voters’ preferences for two green policies scenarios
considered in Section 4. Possible limitations of an empirical framework using
stated preferences are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 ﬁnally concludes.
2 Survey Design and Sample
Lancaster (1966) emphasizes that goods purchased in the market are not always
the immediate source of utility, but that people derive utility from the array of
characteristics inherent in the particular good. Along these lines, we postulate
that a consumer’s WTP is linked to the characteristics of the good via a bid
5Figure 1: Stylized Survey Pie Chart
What is the monetary amount that you would be willing to pay at most for the
contract shown on the right hand side, given that electricity generated entirely from
fossil fuels costs e100?
function. We assume that an individual i evaluates the good electricity by its
underlying fuel mix and specify the bid function:
(1) WTPi = f (fossil, renewable, nuclear),
with the shares of fossil (coal, oil, gas), renewable (wind, photovoltaic, water),
and nuclear fuels as the elements in the electricity fuel mix.
We have acquired our data by surveying households from an online panel, for
which the survey institute recruits the households in a complex multi-stage pro-
cedure and ensures that the panel is representative for the German population. A
set of socio-economic and demographic background information is automatically
stored within the system. Each panel household is equipped with a “set-top-
box” connecting the household’s TV with the internet. Respondents can ﬁll in
the questionnaire using a remote control.
Several formats have been suggested to elicit WTP in surveys, each possessing
speciﬁc weaknesses and strengths (see Frew et al. 2003). Formats suggested in
previous literatures include open-ended formats such as ours, close-ended formats,
6payment scale, and bidding/bargaining formats.2 We have chosen an open-ended
format to avoid ex-ante restriction of responses and anchoring eﬀects: contracts
were assigned no oﬀer values and responses were allowed to vary in a broad range
between e0 and e9,999. A potential drawback of such a format is its failure
to provide subjects with a clue as to plausible values. Other approaches such
as the closed-ended format give more guidance to the survey participants. The
choice of the predetermined values, however, is a normative judgment provided
by the researcher, and responses may be sensitive to the predetermined values.
Moreover, since electricity is a good that respondents know from daily experience,
we believe that ill-considered valuations are not a too large burden in our analysis.
Another potential drawback of the open-ended format is the possible occurrence
of protest bids in the data, meaning respondents that either give a zero value to
a good that has actually a value or assign an obvious invalid high value to the
good (Halstead et al. 1992). However, as our empirical analysis will show below,
protest bids are not of importance in our data.
In the survey, each survey participant is presented with ﬁve hypothetical elec-
tricity contracts, diﬀering in the fuel shares contributing to the electricity gen-
eration, and is asked to state his individual WTP for a contract with a speciﬁc
fuel mix. Pie charts appear on the television screen that depict alternative mixes
(see Figure 1). Underneath the pie charts, respondents state their WTP for the
contract in a pre-speciﬁed ﬁeld. We lack information about the actual individ-
ual electricity consumption and the corresponding cost. To avoid people stating
a monetary amount that is inﬂated by their individual electricity consumption,
which would yield incomparable responses from households with diﬀerent con-
sumption, we provide people a mental anchor point by choosing a benchmark
2In case of the open-ended format, each subject reports her own WTP. Responses are unbounded
and there is no predetermined oﬀer value. In case of the payment scale format, all subjects
chose a value from the same pre-speciﬁed and ordered list. In case of the closed-ended format,
respondents are required to make an accept/reject choice at predetermined oﬀer values. In
case of bidding/bargaining formats, the researcher suggests WTP values that the respondents
accept or reject.
7Table 1: Pool of Electricity Contracts
Renewable share









contract with 100% fossil fuels, and normalize its price to 100 monetary units.
Deviations in stated WTP from this benchmark can be interpreted as price pre-
mia or deductions associated with a speciﬁc variation in the fuel mix.
While in total 14 contracts are available (including the benchmark contract),
we limit the evaluation task for each respondent to ﬁve randomly drawn alter-
natives. The grey-shaded area in Table 1 illustrates the set of contracts.3 The
ordering in which these ﬁve contracts are presented to the respondents may af-
fect respondents’ bids. For example, showing initially a contract with e.g. 25%
renewables in the fuel mix followed by an evaluation task with 50% renewables
may give rise to a speciﬁc WTP pattern. This is the so-called ‘ordering eﬀect’
(Bateman and Langford 1997, Clark and Friesen 2008). Empirical evidence on
the presence of ordering eﬀects in contingent valuation studies is mixed (Boyle
et al. 1993). To minimize ordering-related biases, we randomize the draws from
the set of available contracts. Accordingly, each possible sequence of evaluation
tasks that can be constructed from Table 1 has the same chance to been drawn,
and the probability that the same sequence will occur twice is extremely low.
Thus, even if respondents’ later bids are inﬂuenced by the its initial bid, ordering
eﬀects should not play a role at the sample level.
3A stepwise variation of fuel shares has also been implemented in Menges et al. (2005).




Western Germany 2,329 79%





High-school degree 1,105 37%
Below high-school degree 1,843 63%
Mean Std.dev.
Equivalent income (e) 1,550 707
Age 49.5 13.4
Number of adults in the household 1.83 0.73
Number of children in the household 0.45 0.82
About 2,948 households have participated in our survey in 2008. As our par-
ticipants face ﬁve diﬀerent evaluation tasks, our data exhibits a panel structure.
Not all households have provided ﬁve WTP assessments (on average: 4.7 as-
sessments per household), and we end up with an unbalanced panel of 14,532
observations with about 1,000 responses for each hypothetical contract.
Sample characteristics are given in Table 2. About 79% of the sample house-
holds live in western Germany, which is conform with the regional distribution of
the German population described by oﬃcial census data. Because the question-
naire was addressed to the person who contributes most to the household income
(the “household head”), the sample consists mainly of males. About 37 percent
of the respondents have at least a high school degree. Average age is about 50
years. The typical participating household has a disposable equivalent income of
e1,550 per month, and consists on average of 1.83 adults and 0.45 children.4
4We chose the equivalent income as the income variable to make household incomes comparable
across households of diﬀerent size or structure. Equivalent income is computed by deﬂating the
household’s income by an index I =1+0.5×(number of adults−1)+0.3×number of children,
that takes into account the number of adults and children living in the household unit. The




The upper panel of Figure 2 provides descriptive statistics for the WTP responses
while in the lower panel boxplots illustrate the distributions of the responses for
every evaluated contract. Both panels exhibit the same structure: The topmost
row refers to a contract with a mix of 75 percent fossil fuels, zero percent nuclear
fuels and 25 percent renewable fuels. In the three adjacent rows, the nuclear
share is held constant while the renewable share is increased in 25 percent steps.
In the rows ﬁve to eight (nine to eleven; twelve to thirteen), the nuclear share is
held constant at 25 percent and, again, the renewable share is increased.
Figure 2 reveals two regularities. First, WTP tends to rise in the share of
renewable fuels in the electricity mix. Take, for example, the rows nine to eleven,
where fossil fuel is sequentially replaced by renewable fuel, keeping the nuclear
share constant at 50 percent. Both the descriptive statistics and the boxplots
depict that WTP rises in the share of green electricity, indicating a preference for
green electricity generation. On the other hand, the ﬁgures in rows 1, 6, 10 and
13 suggest that the WTP tends to be decreasing in the nuclear share, indicating
that nuclear fuels are perceived as an economic ‘bad’, lowering the utility of the
typical consumer. Using rank-sum tests for trends across ordered groups (Cuzick
1985), we test for diﬀerences in stated WTP across fuel mixes. Holding the
nuclear share constant, the tests conﬁrm a signiﬁcant increase in WTP with a
rising share of renewable fuels. In a like manner, holding the share of renewable
fuels constant, the tests conﬁrm a signiﬁcant decrease in stated WTP as the
nuclear share increases.
In our survey, we have chosen an open-ended format. Inherent in its nature
is the problem that respondents may feel tempted to protest speciﬁc contracts
being presented, meaning that respondents reject a speciﬁc electricity mix by










Power Mean Std.Dev Median
75 25 0 1,008 97 29.7 100
50 50 0 1,056 101 30.8 100
25 75 0 1,031 106 32.9 102
0 100 0 1,084 112 37.2 110
75 0 25 1,063 85 30.4 85
50 25 25 1,090 91 29.5 100
25 50 25 1,048 96 29.5 100
0 75 25 1,058 99 34.6 100
50 0 50 1,054 81 30.3 80
25 25 50 1,061 87 32.0 90
0 50 50 1,055 92 30.6 100
25 0 75 951 76 33.4 80
0 25 75 1,088 81 33.8 80
Means, standard deviations, and medians in full e.

























11responding a WTP of ’0’. However, Figure 2 reveals that the number of protest
bids in our data is small. This can also bee seen from Figure A.1 in the Ap-
pendix, which illustrates the empirical distribution of WTP responses by means
of contract-speciﬁc histograms. These histograms also convey another relevant
piece of information. In the survey instructions, we explained the assessment
problem to the respondents using two examples for which we have imbedded
ﬁctitious arbitrarily selected WTP statements of 70 and 180 Euro. These two
numbers may serve as an anchor, so that respondents’ bids may cluster around
these values. The histograms in Figure A.1, however, do not indicate the presence
of such an eﬀect.
3.2 Econometric Analysis
3.2.1 Estimation Method
Random-parameter techniques oﬀer the required ﬂexibility to cope with pref-
erence heterogeneity by allowing for the estimation of personalized regression
coeﬃcients βik := βk + uik. The random deviations uik measure the deviation of
individual i from the mean taste βk for a speciﬁc fuel k. Hence, βik depicts an
individual slope coeﬃcient, and we assume that the uik are normally distributed
in the population, with a zero mean and an unknown standard deviation.
We model the individual WTP response for contract j =1 ,...,13 in linear
form:
(2) WTPij = α +

k
(βk + uik)xjk +

l
δlzil + vi + εij,
where xjk captures the mix of the k fuels in contract j. We include the share
of renewables and the share of nuclear fuels in xjk, but drop the share of fossil
fuels because of collinearity reasons.5 An interaction term Renewable×Nuclear
5Note that the sum of fuel shares adds up to unity and the share of fossil fuels is therefore a
linear combination of the renewables and nuclear fuels.
12captures possible interdependencies of preferences for renewables and nuclear
fuels. The vector z z zi contains the household’s equivalent income, the household’s
size, and a binary variable that indicates whether a household lives in the east
of Germany, and δ δ δ is an unknown parameter vector. By controlling for the
socioeconomic background of the households, we aim at assessing some of the
preference heterogeneity among clusters of households with respect to the fuel
mix. The random eﬀect vi serves to shift the regression line up or down according
to the individual household.
We refer to equation (2) – our most ﬂexible speciﬁcation – as model 1, and test
the sensitivity of our results with respect to nested, less ﬂexible speciﬁcations.
To this end, we re-estimate the random parameter speciﬁcation but constrain the
individual preferences to equal the mean taste, i.e we invoke uik = 0 for all k and
every individual. We refer to this second speciﬁcation as model 2. Finally, in our
third speciﬁcation we further exclude the household characteristics included in z z zi
from the analysis (i.e. δ δ δ =0 0 0).
3.2.2 Econometric Results
The results from our three regression models are summarized in Table 3, reporting
the results for model 1 in the ﬁrst and the second column, for model 2 in columns
three and four, and for model 3 in the remaining columns. The upper panel of
Table 3 reﬂects the coeﬃcient estimates and respective standard errors (s.e.).
The middle panel reports the standard deviations for the random parameters
in the respective models. The lower panel of Table 3 depicts likelihood-ratio
statistics, clearly indicating that the random parameter speciﬁcations of model 1
provides a ﬂexibility that boosts the model ﬁt. In the following we will therefore
concentrate the discussion on model 1.
The WTP is increasing in the share of renewable fuels, as suggested by the
descriptives of the previous section. Compared to the benchmark contract with
13Table 3: Summary of Regression Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coeﬃcient s.e. Coeﬃcient s.e. Coeﬃcient s.e.
Constant 87.978∗∗ 1.869 88.561∗∗ 1.904 90.263∗∗ 0.771
Renewables 22.234∗∗ 1.025 22.142∗∗ 0.973 22.163∗∗ 0.973
Nuclear −20.101∗∗ 1.283 −19.870∗∗ 1.265 −19.851∗∗ 1.265
Renewables×Nuclear 0.047 2.903 0.271 3.102 0.212 3.102
Household Size −0.429 0.480 −0.496 0.479
East −2.349 1.265 −3.054∗ 1.267
Income 0.003∗∗ 0.001 0.002∗∗ 0.001
Log-Likelihood -63,306 -63,989 -63,999
Standard deviation for random parameters
Std.Dev s.e Std.Dev s.e. Std.Dev s.e.









parameter restrictions 3 3
2 × ΔLog-Likelihood 1366 20
∗∗signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ∗signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Critical value for model comparison:
χ2
0.99(df =3 )=1 1 .35.
pure fossil fuels, increasing the share of renewable fuels from zero to one by one
– meaning switching from zero to 100% – raises the WTP by 22.23%. On the
other hand, increasing the share of nuclear fuels in the electricity mix yields
a substantial decrease in average WTP. All the reported standard deviations
for the random parameters distributions are highly signiﬁcant (see the middle
panel of Table 3), indicating that the ui vary substantially among individuals.
In other words, we observe considerable preference heterogeneity concerning the
assessment of the various fuels.
Turning to the personal characteristics vector z z zi, we ﬁnd that larger house-
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Renew x Nuclear
holds and respondents living in the former East of Germany generally want to
pay less, though both estimated coeﬃcients lack statistical signiﬁcance.6 Finally,
WTP is slightly rising in equivalent household income.7
Figure 3 provides histograms illustrating the empirical distributions of the
respondent-speciﬁc intercepts and slopes. In sum, the ﬁgures reconﬁrm our pre-
vious conclusions of a positive marginal WTP for green electricity, and a negative
marginal WTP for the nuclear fuel share. However, substantial diﬀerences in the
individual slope coeﬃcients pertaining to the renewable and fossil fuel shares ex-
ist. For instance, several individual slope coeﬃcients for ‘Nuclear’ fall below a
6A preference divide between the two former parts of Germany has also been found in other
areas. For example, Alesina and Fuchs-Sch¨ undeln (2007) ﬁnd such an eﬀect to be present in
evaluations of public social policies that entail redistribution.
7See Wiser (2006), Bergmann et al. (2006) or Zarnikau (2003) for supportive evidence.
15value of −60, compared to a grand mean of −20.101. The coeﬃcient of ‘Renew-
ables’ exhibits a similar variation.
A speciﬁc strength of the random parameter speciﬁcation of model 1 is cor-
roborated in the histograms for the interaction Renewables × Nuclear. The re-
spective histogram shows a rather symmetrical empirical coeﬃcient distribution
with large tails, but centered around zero. While the mean coeﬃcient therefore
appears statistically insigniﬁcant, since half of the probability mass fall on ei-
ther side of zero, the individual coeﬃcient might be nevertheless of statistical
signiﬁcance.
4 Evaluating Energy Policy Options
Renewable fuels accounted for some 15% in Germany’s gross electricity genera-
tion in 2008, while about 23% came from nuclear fuels. With almost 60% the
lion’s share of Germany’s electricity generation relies on fossil fuels, while the re-
maining 2% were generated using “other fuels” (BMWi 2010:19).8 The German
government aims at redesigning the energy system towards an economic, sustain-
able and secure energy supply. A German particularity is the nuclear phase-out
on which the government and the electricity producer had agreed upon in 2002.
While this agreement is still in force, there is a lively and ongoing discussion
about a possible recurrence of nuclear energy in power generation.
Renewables shall become the most important fuels in the future electricity
mix. The German government has committed to enhance the renewable share
in domestic electricity generation to at least 30% in 2020. In order to assist
the generation of green electricity, Germany provides a feed-in tariﬀ regime. In
8These “other fuels” are non-renewable waste or large hydropower plants. These fuels do not
serve as a stimulus variable in our survey. As they neither incorporate a technical risk, like
the nuclear option, nor do they receive public ﬁnancial support, it appears reasonable to treat
them like a fossil fuel. We hence add their share to the share of fossil fuels in the following
analysis.
162008, the total subsidy payments amount to 8.7 bn Euros and are expected to
reach 12.7 bn Euros in 2010. Selling the generated green electricity at the market
yields sales revenues but since the feed-in tariﬀ exceeds the market price by a
large amount (depending on the renewable technology),9 a diﬀerence remains for
which every household in Germany is committed to pay a levy. In 2008, a levy of
1.1 ct per consumed kWh was raised, while the average consumer electricity price
amounts to 21.43 ct/kWh (BMU 2008, BMWi 2009:35-37). Hence, the consumer
price “net” of the levy amounts to 20.33 ct/kWh. Between 2008 and 2010 the
total subsidy spending rose by almost 46%, and the levy charged in 2010 amounts
to 2.047 ct/kWh.
4.1 Assessment and Scenario Set-Up
Whether a household favors one fuel mix – associated with a respective levy –
relative to another mix (and another levy), depends on the respectively achieved












where s ∈{ 0,15,30a,30b} denotes scenarios linked to a speciﬁc fuel mix in the
electricity generation (see below). While p refers to the consumer net price for
electricity, ts denotes the levy associated with the share of renewables in the fuel
mix. Whereas the ﬁrst term in (3) captures the increase in WTP by passing from
s =0t os  = 0, the second term captures the increase in the consumer price due
to the levy. Household i prefers situation s  =0t os = 0 if ΔCS is positive in
Equation (3), meaning that the relative rise in the household’s individual WTP
outperforms the relative price increase due to the levy. By requiring ΔCSs
i ≥ 0
9For further details see the respective German act on the priority treatment of renewable energies
(“Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz”).
17Table 4: Electricity Mix Scenarios
Scenario: s = 0 15 30a 30b
Fuel Share in %
Fossil 69.5 62 54.5 62
Nuclear 30.5 23 15.5 8
Renewables 0 15 30 30
Consumer price ct/kWh 20.33 21.43
Levy ct/kWh 0 1.1








− p ≥ t
s
that might be charged, such that household i still prefers s  =0t os =0 .
Details of the four diﬀerent scenarios s are depicted in Table 4. The scenario
s = 15 refers to the “status-quo” fuel mix of 2008 in the electricity generation,
exhibiting a share of 15% renewable fuels and associated with an average con-
sumer price p+t15 of 21.43 ct/kWh (including a levy of t15 = 1.1 ct/kWh). The
scenario s = 0 illustrates a hypothetical situation with zero renewable fuels in the
electricity mix. The 15% renewables of the status-quo scenario are equally as-
signed to the shares of fossil and nuclear fuels. Because no levy would be charged
in such a situation, the consumer price p0 equals the “net” price of 20.33 ct/kWh.
By comparing scenario s =1 5t os = 0 – meaning that we analyze what fraction
of people exhibits a positive expression in Equation (3) – we might provide an
answer to whether today’s policy is supported by a majority of people eligible to
vote.
The two hypothetical scenarios 30a and 30b both refer to the commitment of
the German government to increase the share of renewable fuels in the electricity
generation to 30% until 2020. While we increase the renewable-fuel share by 15
percent points in scenario 30a (compared to the “status-quo”) at equal expense
of the shares from the other two fuels, fossil and nuclear, the rise in the renew-
18able share in scenario 30b causes a 1:1 reduction of the nuclear share. Against
this backdrop, we quantify the maximal levy levels chargeable, such that still a
majority of people supports the policy.
Our econometric results render the preference structure for every single sam-
ple household, providing the information on whether household i maintains a
positive ΔCSs
i in Equation (3). In order to derive representative population
statistics, we weight each sample household by the household’s frequency weight.
The frequency weights extrapolate the sample households in order to best ﬁt
the German micro-census statistics, and consider three household characteristics
for extrapolation: monthly household net income, household size, and region of
residence (Germany’s 16 federal states).10 In a second step, we multiply every
(weighted) household by its number of adults (age 18 and older) and end up with
the number of potential voters in the household. In this regard, it is a minor as-
sumption that we assume identical preferences for all adult persons in a sampled
household.11
4.2 Scenario Outcomes
Using the preference structure inferred from model 1, Figure 4 illustrates the
public support as a function of the levy. The ordinate renders the share of people
who are willing-to-pay at least the respectively charged levy, and the horizontal
dashed line marks the share of 50% of people. If the marker of an associated
scenario falls below the horizontal line, the respective levy will be no longer
accepted by the majority of people. For instance, the downward sloping line
pertaining to scenario s = 15 shows a rapidly falling acceptance of subsidizing
10The frequency weights are derived using the software ‘Adjust’ (for further information see Merz
(1994)), which relies on an entropy based minimum information loss principle. The software
incorporates a numerical solution by means of a modiﬁed Newton-Raphson procedure with a
global exponential approximation.
11As a referee noted, there is a diﬀerence between a registered and a typical voter. We lack
information about the voting behavior of our sample households. Therefore our results reﬂect
the preferences in the population eligible to vote and not the actual outcome of an election.






























renewables as the levy increases. Note that our survey was conducted in 2008
while scenario s = 15 renders the German electricity fuel mix of 2008. Our
results show for this scenario that the median voter would have accepted a levy
of 1.02 ct/kWh in order to promote the respective green electricity generation.
By contrast, only 47% of the voters would have also endorsed the actual charged
levy of 1.1 ct/kwh in 2008, meaning that the policy barely had the support of the
majority of people. Similar ﬁndings are reported in Batley et al. (2001) for UK
and Bollino (2009) for Italy, whose results demonstrate that consumer’s WTP for
green electricity is too low to meet the respective Government’s green electricity
commitment for 2010. Scarpa and Willis (2010) provide WTP estimates from
UK households for micro-systems to generate green electricity, indicating that
the average WTP falls well below the typical investment cost.
The dotted and the triangular line refer to the scenarios s =3 0 a and s =3 0 b,
respectively. Both scenarios enlarge the share of renewable fuels in the electricity
20generation and provide valuable information with respect to the scope of the
levy that might be charged for a future fuel mix. The public support is highest
in s =3 0 b where renewable fuels are extended only at the expense of nuclear
fuels: 50% of the people would accept a levy of at most 2.37 ct/kWh to subsidize
green electricity. In scenario s =3 0 a the extension of renewable fuels reduces the
contribution of nuclear and fossil fuels, and nuclear fuels would still contribute
more than 15% to the electricity supply. The median voter would accept in that
scenario a levy of at most 2.03 ct/kWh. The public acceptance vanishes in both
scenarios if the charged levy would exceed 6 ct/kWh.
The policy implications of our results are straightforward and challenging.
On the one hand, the German population strongly dislikes nuclear fuels in the
electricity generation. On the other hand, substituting nuclear by renewable fuels
is only a possible option if the associated levy won’t increase too much, since the
peoples’ acceptance of such a policy has its (ﬁnancial) limits. The challenging
task is to ﬁnd a balance between greening the electricity mix and the veriﬁcation
not to escalate the subsidy spending. Germany’s feed-in-tariﬀ promotes various
renewable fuels but lacks a mechanism to limit the public spending. Conse-
quently, already in 2010 a levy 2.047 ct/kWh will be charged – associated with
an estimated renewable fuel share of about 18%.
5 Possible Limitations of Stated-Preferences Ap-
proaches
Stated preference approaches have the central advantage that the survey question
can be designed in a way that it directly addresses the research question, even if
the market design prevents inference from revealed preference data. In our case,
for instance, both the levy and the electricity mix are triggered by a political
decision and therefore given to the consumer. Consequently, data on the revealed
21demand of green electricity do not reﬂect consumer preferences, meaning that a
revealed preference approach is not feasible.
Inherent in the nature of surveys, however, is the absence of a mechanism
that ensures that rational agents have an incentive to reveal preferences truth-
fully. Though Hanemann (1994:37) emphasizes that “there is no reason why
observing people’s behavior and asking them about behavioral intentions and
motives should be mutually exclusive”, there is still a debate whether survey re-
spondents “mean what they say” (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001).12 In our
case, for example, not revealing the true WTP has no immediate negative conse-
quences for respondents as contracts provided had been hypothetical, and stated
WTP levels had no ﬁnancial consequences. In the absence of opportunity costs,
however, “customers can have a tendency to de-emphasize price, since they do
not actually have to pay the price” (Goett et al. 2000:27). The diﬀerence between
stated and revealed values is referred to as “hypothetical bias.”
Carson et al. (1996) review more than 600 studies, and demonstrate that
stated preference tasks typically average about 90% of the corresponding revealed
valuation, hence, slightly underestimate the benchmark of revealed valuation.
Murphy et al. (2005) conduct an econometric meta-analysis of hypothetical bias,
and found evidence of a positive but small bias. They conclude that hypothet-
ical bias “may not be as signiﬁcant a problem in stated preference analyses as
is often thought” (Murphy et al. 2005:323). Along these lines, studies from the
recreational choice literature have often found no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ences between demand functions derived from revealed and hypothetical data.13
With respect to green electricity, Champ and Bishop (2001) and Poe et al. (2002)
provide evidence that a hypothetical character of the evaluation task yields a pos-
12Diamond and Hausman (1994), Ajzen et al. (1996), Diamond (1996), and Smith and Osborne
(1996) investigate the information content of contingent valuation survey. For case studies, see
also Cummings and Taylor (1999), List (2001), Loomis et al. (1997) or Neill et al. (1994).
13See Alberini et al. (2007) for a review of related literature; a more pessimistic view is expressed
in Harrison and Rutstr¨ om (2008).
22itive bias, meaning that hypothetical values overstate actual (revealed) values.
Though we cannot ensure that our WTP estimates overstate the “ true” values,
such a pattern would even strengthen our results: if our respondents would ac-
tually pay less than stated, the public support for any level of the charged levy
would decrease. Then, our results should be conceived as an upper bound for the
underlying population preferences.
A reliable exposure of preferences requires that stated preferences remain sta-
ble between evaluation tasks (Hanemann 1994). To investigate whether this is
the case, we have confronted all our respondents with a further assessment prob-
lem. More precisely, each respondent was presented ﬁve attributes of electricity
contracts, including the absence of nuclear fuels in electricity generation and
electricity generation using renewable fuels. The participants were asked to rank
these attributes with respect to desirability, with the largest rank indicating the
most important attribute (see the Appendix for further details). Preferences re-
main stable if responses in both survey parts are consistent, meaning e.g. that
a strong preference for green fuels is associated with a high individual regres-
sion coeﬃcient, and also a high rank for the attribute “electricity generated from
renewable fuels”. A consistent representation of preference for renewable fuels
would therefore require a positive correlation between the individual regression
coeﬃcient and the attribute’s rank. By contrast, a preference against nuclear fu-
els is consistently reﬂected in a low individual regression coeﬃcient for the nuclear
share, accompanied by a high rank of the attribute “nuclear-free electricity gen-
eration”. We thus expect a negative correlation between the individual regression
coeﬃcient for nuclear fuels and the respective attribute.
Indeed, Spearman rank correlation coeﬃcients exhibit the expected signs and
are highly signiﬁcant. The Spearman rank correlation coeﬃcient between the in-
dividual parameter for the share of green electricity and the rank for the contract
attribute “electricity generation from renewable fuels” is 0.2814 and signiﬁcant
at the level p<0.001. Likewise, the Spearman rank correlation between the
23individual parameter for the share of nuclear fuels and the rank for the absence
of nuclear fuels in electricity generation amounts to -0.3050 at p<0.001.
6 Conclusion
The German government has committed to increase the share of renewable fuels
in electricity generation to at least 30% until 2020, and provides a feed-in tariﬀ to
encourage green electricity generation. This subsidy is ﬁnanced by a levy on top
of the consumer electricity price, amounting to 1.1 ct/kWh in 2008. While the
cost of the subsidy scheme is shifted to the consumer due to a political decision,
it is an open question whether the policy maker act on behalf of the preferences
of the voting majority. This paper provides insights into the people’s preferences
for greening the electricity mix and renders guidance for policy makers against
the backdrop of green electricity commitment for 2020.
In a ﬁrst step, we use a large-scale household survey to elicit peoples’ pref-
erences for diﬀerent fuels in the electricity generation. We capture preference
heterogeneity among the respondents by applying random parameter regression
techniques within a hedonic approach. Our results suggest that the majority
of our respondents has a positive WTP for renewable, and a negative WTP for
nuclear fuels, both characterized by a substantial variability.
Using these WTP estimates we gauge in a second step the maximal charge-
able levy for a speciﬁc fuel mix, such that a majority of people would approve
that policy. We evaluate three diﬀerent scenarios, one of which consists of the
actual fuel mix of 2008. We ﬁnd that the actual charged levy of 1.1 ct/kWh
exceeds the WTP for slightly more than 50% of the population, meaning that
the actual policy barely has the support of the majority of voters. We further
determine the maximal chargeable levy for two hypothetical future fuel mixes,
both characterized by a share of 30% renewables but diﬀerent shares of nuclear
fuels. According to our results, the charged levy should not exceed 2.03 ct/kWh
24in order to ensure the approval of the voters’ majority. If the renewable fuels
predominantly substitute nuclear fuels, the maximum chargeable levy increases
slightly to 2.37 ct/kWh.
An increase of the share of renewable fuels in electricity generation thus ex-
pands the chargeable levy. However, our results also stress that the possible
ﬁnancial scope to support renewable fuels is basically exhausted. In particular,
a levy of 2.047 ct/kWh will be charged already in 2010 – an amount close to the
maximum chargeable levy of 2.37 ct/kWh – while the estimated renewable share
of 2010 amount only to about 18%. As a consequence, energy policy must amplify
its eﬀorts in making the future promotion of green electricity less cost intensive.
While the current feed-in tariﬀ fosters many generation techniques – even if they
are far from any price competitive level – a reasonable policy redesign might
initiate some extent of competition between renewable generation techniques. A
possible approach would encompass, for instance, a bidding scheme, meaning the
introduction of an upper bound for the annually subsidy spending, and the sup-
ported generation techniques have to compete for these scare ﬁnancial resources.
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Electricity can be generated using diﬀerent types of fuels: fossil (coal, oil and
gas), renewable (wind, solar energy, waterpower), and nuclear fuels. Thus, it is
possible that a household consumes electricity solely generated from
fossil fuels nuclear fuels renewable fuels.
Yet, a household can also consume electricity generated from a mix of fuels, for
example electricity might be generated from all three fuels in equal proportion:
In the following, we will show you several electricity contracts, which only diﬀer
in the composition as to whether the three fuels (fossil, renewable, nuclear) con-
tribute to its generation. We would like to ask you about how much you would
be willing-to-pay for contracting the respective oﬀer. As a comparison, assume
that a benchmark contract, where electricity is entirely generated from fossil fuels
(coal, oil, and gas), is available at a price of e100.
30Example. The price of the benchmark contract (electricity entirely generated
from fossil fuels) is e100. If you are willing-to-pay at most, say, e70 for an alter-
native contract, please state ’70’ in the empty box. If you are willing-to-pay at
most, say, e180 for the alternative contract, please state ’180’ in the empty box.
Of course, all other values are feasible.
In the following, the benchmark contract (electricity entirely generated from fossil
fuels and with a price of e100) will always appear at the left part of your screen.
The right part of your screen will show an alternative contract, where electricity
is generated using diﬀerent shares of the three fuels (fossil, renewable, nuclear).
What is the monetary amount that you would be willing to pay at
most for the contract shown on the right hand side, given that elec-
tricity generated entirely from fossil fuels costs e100?
[Technical note. Each respondent had to state her willingness-to-pay for ﬁve
alternative contracts, drawn randomly from a set of 13 diﬀerent contracts. All
values between 0 and 9999 monetary units were feasible.]
31Eliciting Respondent’s Attribute Rankings
If you think about your own supply with electricity, which of the
following product attributes is the most important for you?
• reasonable electricity price
• nuclear-free electricity generation
• electricity generated from renewable fuels such as water, wind,
and photovoltaics
• price guarantee
• short term of notice
And from the remaining attributes?
[Technical note. After respondents have chosen the most important attribute, a
new computer screen occurred where the remaining four (three, etc.) attributes
were provided.]
32Contract-speciﬁc Distributions of Responses
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Note. Figure has the same structure as Table 1. From left to right: Share of renewable
fuels rises from 0 percent to 100 percent (25 percentage steps). From top to bottom:
Share of nuclear fuels rises from 0 percent to 75 percent (25 percentage steps). The
abscissa gives the willingness-to-pay in Euro. The ordinate gives the density.
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